奇安信攻防社区-ADSelfService Plus未授权RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-40539）利用与分析

ADSelfService Plus未授权RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-40539）利用与分析

睡一觉就把漏洞给分析了

#### 题外话

故事要从一段中式英语对话开始说起，起先是看到这是个危险程度严重的新漏洞，然后疯狂在官网找相应漏洞版本的应用找不到，就更有意思了（谁知道暂时没客服回应我，可能是因为美国时间客服正在睡觉吧）

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-4730ccc016db62c335d702d5f55b525075bda930.png)](1)

于是睡了一觉，早上看到邮件。于是就兴奋的开始了漏洞复现，顺便细心分析了一波（好心人已公开链接，不过是免费版）

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-2c6b4c51c07c0c92d6131e6dc07ff5bd1854f455.png)](2)

#### 步入正题

漏洞描述
----

ZOHO ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus是美国卓豪（ZOHO）公司的针对 Active Directory 和云应用程序的集成式自助密码管理和单点登录解决方案。

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-e5cf28557eecafe7014d00376156c517bd047bbc.png)](3)

Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus 6113版本及更早版本存在授权问题漏洞，该漏洞源于软件很容易绕过REST API认证，从而导致远程代码执行。

漏洞利用与分析
-------

应用搭建安装后的效果如下（首次及默认账号密码为admin\\admin）：

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-20a11a223f0a0cc23b932165290b6da8d47d0643.png)](4)

根据官方修复资料来看，先去 `ManageEngineADSFrameworkJava.jar`中 `com.manageengine.ads.fw.api.RestAPIUtil`类看看验证绕过漏洞的修复前后

```java
 public static boolean isRestAPIRequest(HttpServletRequest request, JSONObject  filterParams)
  {
    String restApiUrlPattern = "/RestAPI/.*";
    try
    {
      restApiUrlPattern = filterParams.optString("API_URL_PATTERN",  restApiUrlPattern);
    }
    catch (Exception ex)
    {
      out.log(Level.INFO, "Unable to get API_URL_PATTERN.", ex);
    }
    String reqURI = request.getRequestURI();
    String contextPath = request.getContextPath() != null ?  request.getContextPath() : "";
    reqURI = reqURI.replace(contextPath, "");
    reqURI = reqURI.replace("//", "/");
    return Pattern.matches(restApiUrlPattern, reqURI);
  }
```

修复后的reqURI将通过`getNormalizedURI`方法对url进行`/.`和`/..`的过滤和多余/的删除

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-87a60c6d676d40bb8e23463ac5aa1888039c925a.png)](5)

根据 <https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/77c3dc36ac7df4c04e3ff7cd97f5f63ec8dc7311/cves/2021/CVE-2021-40539.yaml> 的描述，尝试发送验证是否存在身份验证绕过的漏洞。经测试url路径前以下字符均可绕过身份验证

```java
/./
/.///
///.///
/.//.///
/../
```

返回包表明路径遍历请求实际上绕过了认证过程

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-2db5adf2948d876b7fd9d56be3f1e7dcbd9bd3e9.png)](6)

接下来利用`/./`的身份验证绕过实现任意及恶意文件的上传，通过跟踪漏洞中所利用到的文件上传的接口，找到 `AdventNetADSMClient.jar`中的 `LogonCustomization`类，类中的`unspecified`方法（ 原本`unspecified`是添加智能卡相关配置参数的方法）存在与文件上传相关的函数，对`unspecified`方法进行分析，确定了达到文件上传条件所需要的参数

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-942cfd881b6a662755d6b03d255111aee10699f8.png)](7)

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-0742d8fdc1f307a82bd2b735deb45bf904537efd.png)](8)

试着跟进`sCAction.addSmartCardConfig()`看看是如何写文件的，`sCAction.addSmartCardConfig()` —&gt; `mapping.findForward(addSmartCardConfig()` —&gt; `FileActionHandler.getFileFromRequest()`，结果是直接将form下要上传的文件内容以form中`filename`参数命名方式直接写进了`应用启动程序bin`目录下，还以为会稍微有点过滤

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-ecd72757e86e6728a9920baae9393e08dbca1d50.png)](9)

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-1f134d12ffec5b41be576b0fcf8200b7f2c651e7.png)](10)

那这边我先上传个编译后的弹计算器的`class`文件，以备后续使用

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-3736290740398cca61fb19ebccd67c7af25c637d.png)](11)

接着在`AdventNetADSMClient.jar`下`ConnectionAction`类的`openSSLTool`方法，可不需要过滤接受http请求下的`action`参数值，如果等于`generateCSR`即执行`SSLUtil.createCSR()`

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-cb51a4ff864223c55bc1e31e7ad8b72f7f80bcc9.png)](12)

跟踪`SSLUtil.createCSR()`，映入眼帘的是keytool这个工具的执行和执行keytool所必需的参数，这边看到`keysize`和`validity`这两个参数值可通过http传入可控且没受任何过滤，将拼接进`keyCmd`的keytool命令执行语句中，最后执行`runCommand(keyCmd.toString());`

```java
public class SSLUtil
{
  private static Logger logger = Logger.getLogger(SSLUtil.class.getName());

public static void createCSR(HttpServletRequest request)
    throws Exception
  {
    JSONObject sslParams = new JSONObject();
    sslParams.put("COMMON_NAME", request.getParameter("NAME"));
    sslParams.put("SAN_NAME", request.getParameter("SAN_NAME"));
    sslParams.put("OU", request.getParameter("OU"));
    sslParams.put("ORGANIZATION", request.getParameter("ORGANIZATION"));
    sslParams.put("LOCALITY", request.getParameter("LOCALITY"));
    sslParams.put("STATE", request.getParameter("STATE"));
    sslParams.put("COUNTRY_CODE", request.getParameter("COUNTRY_CODE"));
    sslParams.put("PASSWORD", request.getParameter("PASSWORD"));
    sslParams.put("VALIDITY", request.getParameter("VALIDITY"));
    sslParams.put("KEY_LENGTH", request.getParameter("KEY_LENGTH"));

JSONObject csrStatus = createCSR(sslParams);
    if (csrStatus.has("eStatus")) {
      request.setAttribute("status", customizeError(csrStatus.optString("eStatus",  null)));
    } else {
      request.setAttribute("status", "success");
    }
  }

public static JSONObject createCSR(JSONObject sslSettings)
    throws Exception
  {
    String name = "\"" + sslSettings.optString("COMMON_NAME", null) + "\"";
    String pass = sslSettings.optString("PASSWORD", null);
    pass = ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(pass);
    String password = "\"" + pass + "\"";
    logger.log(Level.INFO, "Keystore will be created for " + name);

File keyFile = new File("..\\jre\\bin\\SelfService.keystore");
    if (keyFile.exists())
    {
      File bckFile = new File("..\\jre\\bin\\SelfService_" +  System.currentTimeMillis() + ".keystore");
      keyFile.renameTo(bckFile);
    }
    StringBuilder keyCmd = new StringBuilder("..\\jre\\bin\\keytool.exe   -J-Duser.language=en -genkey -alias tomcat -sigalg SHA256withRSA -keyalg RSA  -keypass ");
    keyCmd.append(password);

keyCmd.append(" -storePass ").append(password);

String keyLength = sslSettings.optString("KEY_LENGTH", null);
    if ((keyLength != null) && (!keyLength.equals(""))) {
      keyCmd.append(" -keysize ").append(keyLength);
    }
    String validity = sslSettings.optString("VALIDITY", null);
    if ((validity != null) && (!validity.equals(""))) {
      keyCmd.append(" -validity ").append(validity);
    }
    String san_name = sslSettings.optString("SAN_NAME", null);

keyCmd.append(" -dName  \"CN=").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("COMMON_NAME",  null)));
    keyCmd.append(", OU=  ").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("OU", null)));
    keyCmd.append(",  O=").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("ORGANIZATION",  null)));
    keyCmd.append(",  L=").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("LOCALITY", null)));
    keyCmd.append(",  S=").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("STATE", null)));
    keyCmd.append(",  C=").append(ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(sslSettings.optString("COUNTRY_CODE",  null)));

keyCmd.append("\" -keystore ..\\jre\\bin\\SelfService.keystore");
    if ((san_name != null) && (!san_name.equals("")))
    {
      keyCmd.append(" -ext SAN=");
      String[] san_name_arr = san_name.split(",");
      for (int i = 0; i < san_name_arr.length; i++)
      {
        if (i != 0) {
          keyCmd.append(",");
        }
        keyCmd.append("dns:" + ClientUtil.keyToolEscape(san_name_arr[i]));
      }
    }
    JSONObject jStatus = new JSONObject();
    String status = runCommand(keyCmd.toString());
```

看到`runCommand(keyCmd.toString());`，顾名思义毫无疑问就是直接执行命令，跟踪`runCommand` —&gt; `RunCmd` —&gt; `super(cmd)` 寻其父类 `runRuntimeExec()`，很明显通过`Runtime.getRuntime`执行了该命令

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-b3c4f2b0e649d8155e47974e915409fdc45ec52a.png)](13)

`import com.adventnet.sym.adsm.common.server.util.RunCmd;`

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-699cea8bd4d21d16669ae39767122a4a502b20a2.png)](14)

刚刚说到`keysize`和`validity`这两个参数值可通过http传入可控且没受任何过滤，那么我们可以通过这两个参数进行keytool中有效命令的注入。该程序自带keytool，那么看看其在创建密钥时可用到的options，在可用options可以看到`-providerclass`和`-providerpath`两个可选参数以执行二进制文件即上面所传入的恶意`class文件`

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-2ed0dbe7027387d12900de7a59998de845a798f1.png)](15)

发送以下poc去执行刚刚上传恶意class文件内容的jsp文件

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-ca9f6a3bd8685fd7d755b51d53399fe222d63b67.png)](16)

原先任意文件上传默认上传在bin目录下，而keytool也是在当前目录下，那么`就可以通过keytool的命令注入有效参数以实现来加载任意二进制的java类即class类`

[![](https://shs3.b.qianxin.com/attack_forum/2021/11/attach-f5881456b1fed20128b1f266de0886a7595ce1b4.png)](17)

#### 总结

将以上每个漏洞利用的过程结合在一块就是通过`/./`绕过`RestAPI`的身份验证以上传任意文件到`程序启动bin`目录下，接着利用`keytool命令`的执行拼接有效参数，指向任意`class类以实现任意代码的执行`

修复建议
----

- 目前厂商已发布升级补丁以修复漏洞，补丁获取链接：<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/service-pack.html>
- 这是官方文档中给出的危险检测工具，则是通过日志报错信息、相应路径下是否含有key和证书、不常规web路径下是否含有jsp文件去检测是否被入侵  
    <https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/kb/how-to-fix-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-in-REST-API.html>

发表于 2021-11-12 16:57:59
阅读 ( 10165 )
分类：漏洞分析

ADSelfService Plus未授权RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-40539）利用与分析

0 条评论